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Competition and regulation in European retail
payment systems




In this study, the interaction between the competition-cooperation nexus and
regulation in retail payment systems is analysed by applying the main lessons
from the theory of network industries. This is justifiable on the grounds that the
payment systems industry inherently has many characteristics in common with
network industries. On the other hand, since the provision of payment services
also has many special characteristics, the regulatory tools commonly used in many
other network industries cannot be applied directly. In general, the main role of
payment system regulators is to provide a level playing field for different service
providers. To secure dynamic efficiency, the regulators also need to ensure
adequate incentives for innovation and investment. In this respect, it is important
that they do not take too restrictive an attitude towards cooperation among
payment service providers. In addition to general policy analysis, the study also
analyses developments in the European retail payment system field and the roles
and aims of market participants.
Key words: Competition policy, payment systems, retail payments, network
economics
JEL classification numbers: D49, G28, L984
Kilpailun ja sääntelyn vaikutus eurooppalaisten
pienten maksujen järjestelmien kehitykseen




Tässä tutkimuksessa analysoidaan kilpailun, yhteistyön ja sääntelyn välistä yh-
teyttä pieniä maksuja välittävissä järjestelmissä. Tutkimusongelmaan sovelletaan
verkostotalouden teoriaa. Tämä on mahdollista, koska maksupalvelutoimialalla on
useita samoja piirteitä kuin verkostotoimialalla. Kuitenkin maksupalvelutoimi-
alalla on myös eräitä erityispiirteitä, joiden vuoksi kaikkia perinteisen verkosto-
toimialan sääntelyyn käytettyjä työkaluja ei sellaisinaan voida soveltaa maksujär-
jestelmien sääntelyyn. Maksujärjestelmien sääntelijöiden ensisijaisena tavoitteena
on taata tasapuoliset kilpailuedellytykset kaikille maksupalveluiden tuottajille.
Dynaamisen tehokkuuden turvaamiseksi sääntelijöiden tulee myös varmistaa, että
kannustimet innovaatioihin ja investointeihin säilyvät. Yhteistyötä maksupalvelui-
den tarjoajien kesken ei kuitenkaan tulisi rajoittaa liikaa. Tutkimuksessa analysoi-
daan lisäksi pienten maksujen järjestelmien kehitystä Euroopassa sekä palvelun-
tarjoajien ja sääntelijöiden erilaisia rooleja ja tavoitteita.
Avainsanat: kilpailupolitiikka, maksujärjestelmät, pienet maksut, verkostotalous-
tiede
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The smooth operation of payment systems is often taken for granted both in the
academic literature on financial integration and in practical policy considerations.
However, recent developments in the European integration process have clearly
indicated the critical role of payment systems as part of the financial integration
process. In this context, the smooth and efficient functioning of payment systems,
especially at the cross-border level, has been emphasised. When analysing the
payment system efficiency issues, the interaction between the competition-
cooperation nexus and regulation has been put forward. While competition among
payment service providers
1 has commonly been seen as an important contributor
to efficiency, the need for cooperation in building infrastructures as well as in
defining and implementing standards has also been raised due to the specific
characteristics of the payment industry. In this context, also the appropriate role of
regulation, or more generally, the need for government intervention to maximise
social welfare, has been debated. In essence, the focal point in the debate has been
the trade-off between competition and cooperation, and the potential impact of
regulatory intervention.
Much of the discussion in the European Union has been provoked by the
pricing and costs of cross-border retail payments. Dissatisfied with the
development efforts by the banking sector, the European Parliament and the
Council adopted Regulation (EC) No. 2560/2001 on Cross-border Payments in
Euro (RPE) in December 2001.
2 The RPE obliges banks to reduce charges for
cross-border payments of up to EUR 12,500 (EUR 50,000 as of January 2006) to
the level of those of corresponding domestic payments. The RPE applies to card
payments and ATM (Automated Teller Machine) withdrawals as from 1 July
2002 and to cross-border credit transfers as from 1 July 2003. This policy
intervention was strongly criticised by the banking sector that argued for a
market-driven solution.
At the national levels, competition issues have been raised by authorities,
especially in the card payments area, where the role of interchange fees has
recently been surveyed by regulatory authorities (eg in Australia, EU, and USA).
Moreover, general competition issues in financial markets were studied eg in
Australia and in the United States already in the late 1990s. In Australia, the
Financial System Inquiry, the Wallis Report (1997) released in April 1997,
proposed a regulatory structure to ensure a competitive, efficient and flexible
                                                
1 In this study, payment service providers are defined to be financial institutions in general
(‘banks’ unless otherwise stated). The term payment is used as a synthetic term for any kind of
money transfer executed by a financial institution in the form of both credit and debit transfer as in
Malaguti (1996).
2 See the Official Journal of the European Communities (2001), L 344/13, 28.12.2001.8
financial system consistent with financial stability, integrity and fairness. The
most visible outcome of the report in the payment systems area was the
establishment of Payment Systems Board within the Reserve Bank of Australia.
The Payment Systems Board has concentrated on payment systems regulation and
has initiated studies and provided reports on payment systems competition and
efficiency. In the United States, the Rivlin Committee (1998) examined the role of
the Federal Reserve as a payment service provider dealing also with the
competition issues in the area. More recently competition issues have been
analysed in the UK. The Cruickshank review (H.M. Treasury, 2000a) investigated
UK banking services and concluded that there was a profound lack of competition
in the payment systems. According to the review, this was caused by the
underlying economic characteristics of the industry, where network effects place a
natural limit on the level of competition. HM Treasury subsequently issued a
consultation document (H.M. Treasury, 2000b) on competition in payment
systems, where it announced its intention to give the Office of Fair Trading (OFT)
responsibility for regulation of payment systems and new powers aimed at
promoting effective competition in payment systems for the benefit of
consumers.
3 Also in the Netherlands, the so-called ‘working group Wellink’ has
recently signalled some shortcomings of the Dutch market for retail payments
with respect to the organisation of debit card payments, pricing of consumer
payments, infrastructure and accessibility.
4 Moreover, many national central
banks have dealt with competition issues as part of their payment system
oversight duties. The BIS has published three reports on retail payment issues
(BIS 1999, 2001 and 2002), where the role of central banks in facilitating
competition and efficiency has also been discussed.
Along with the public interest, the interest in the payment systems issues has
also increased since the 1990s both in academic circles and in central banks.
5 In
the area of large-value payment systems, the focus has mainly been on the risk
                                                
3 The OFT has already been examining the pricing of credit card interchange fees.
4 For a comprehensive survey of Dutch retail payment markets and the main issues therein, see
Bolt (2003). A summary discussion of the main conclusions of the Wellink Report (2002) can be
found in De Nederlandsche Bank’s Quarterly Bulletin, June 2002, p. 37–43.
5 See for early general surveys and policy papers eg, Hopton (1983), BIS (1990) and Borio et al
(1992). Other, more theoretical and empirical studies include, inter alia, Angelini and Giannini
(1993), Schoenmaker (1993), Schoenmaker (1995), Calomiris and Kahn (1996), Berger et al
(1996), McAndrews (1997b), Folkerts-Landau (1997), McAndrews (1998), McAndrews and
Roberds (1999), McAndrews et al (1999), Kauko (2000), McAndrews and Roberds (2000),
Holthausen and Rochet (2001), Mantel and McHugh (2001), McAndrews et al (2001), Gangulny
and Milne (2002a), Gangulny and Milne (2002b), and Weinberg (2002). For applications of
network economics in payment systems area and their theoretical and empirical modelling, see eg
Carlton and Frankel (1995), Saloner and Shephard (1995), McAndrews (1996a), McAndrews
(1996b), McAndrews and Rob (1996), McAndrews (1997a), Guibourg (1998), Guibourg (2001),
Leibbrandt (2001), and Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2002).9
and efficiency issues in net and gross settlement systems. Recently these issues
have also been analysed empirically by using a simulation model.
6 Academic
research in the area of retail payment systems has been rather scarce in general,
but intense in some special areas, eg in the pricing of card payments.
7 Less
attention has been paid to the general assessment of regulation and public policy
intervention in retail payment systems given ‘the network nature’ of the business.
In the present study, retail payment systems are analysed as networks and they
are looked at as institutional and infrastructural arrangements for transaction,
clearing and settlement processes. The main aim of this study is to review
academic literature on networks and regulation of networks and assess their
applicability to retail payment systems. Based on that, policy implications are then
discussed and European developments are evaluated. It should, however, be
stressed that the study does not attempt to cover all the systems in work in the
retail payment system field; it mainly concentrates on the credit transfer -type of
systems leaving thus largely out many other systems, most notably card payment
systems. Accordingly, this study cannot offer a full-scale picture of the many-
faceted retail payment system field. Instead, it aims at providing a comprehensive
discussion on competition, cooperation and regulation issues by applying some
key findings of network economics literature.
The study is organised as follows. In Chapter 2, the institutional framework of
retail payment systems in the European Union / euro area is presented
emphasising the fragmented structure of the field. Furthermore, the roles and
policy targets of the key parties involved in the retail payment systems in the euro
area are also analysed. Thereafter, the main current cross-border retail payment
systems in the euro area are presented. Chapter 3 starts with the short ‘BIS-based’
definitions of the retail payment systems and describes the special characteristics
of retail payments that distinguish them from large-value payments. Thereafter,
the network effects in retail payment systems are analysed from the viewpoint of
the network economics theory. The starting point of an economic analysis of
payment systems is the fact that payment service providers often compete directly
in the provision of retail payments instruments and services to end-users but they
also co-operate in shared payment networks (‘upstream cooperation combined
with downstream competition’)
8. This is then combined with traditional lessons
from the network economics literature and the main findings are discussed.
Chapter 3 ends with a brief review of related research carried out in the
                                                
6 See for example, Koponen and Soramäki (1998) for a simulation approach of intraday liquidity
needs in a modern interbank payment system, for liquidity optimisation analyses see Leinonen and
Soramäki (1999), and for gridlock resolution analysis Bech and Soramäki (2001).
7 Seminal analysis of card payment systems was Baxter (1983). More recent studies are Balto
(2000), Reserve Bank of Australia (2000), Rochet and Tirole (2000), Wright (2000), Schmalensee
(2001), Wright (2001a), Wright (2001b), and de Grauwe and Rinaldi (2002).
8 This characterisation of retail payment system is taken from McAndrews and Rob (1996).10
applications of network economics in payment systems, and this will serve as
useful background for the later policy discussions.
The first three chapters lay out the theoretical framework of the study which is
summarised in Figure 1, where the interaction of the competition, cooperation and
regulation is also highlighted. In the remaining three chapters, the focus is on the
network effects in payment systems and their implications on the policy
considerations. In Chapter 4, general implications for competition policy and
regulation are discussed. Market structure issues, standardisation and joint
ventures are also examined. Thereafter, antitrust issues, especially regarding
network exclusivity, are briefly analysed. Moreover, the regulatory tools used in
other network industries are described and their applicability in the context of
retail payment systems is assessed. In Chapter 5, the cooperation-competition
nexus in retail payment systems is evaluated based on the main findings from the
previous chapters. The role of regulatory authorities in shaping the competitive
environment and investment incentives is also assessed. In addition, some
prognoses for the European retail payment markets are presented. Finally, Chapter
6 summarises the main findings of the study.
Figure 1. General framework of the study
REGULATION
Ultimate goal: maximise social welfare
Other objectives: safety and efficiency
Competition
•f o r   the market
•i n  market
Cooperation
• infrastructure
• economies of scale
• critical mass
Role of regulators:
Provide competitive environment (contestable markets) 
and investment/innovation incentives
The Figure 1 demonstrates the interrelationship among competition, cooperation
and regulation in the field of (retail) payment systems. Because of the ‘network
economics nature’ of retail payment systems, competition and cooperation issues
are closely tied. On the one hand, competition among systems is needed in order
to have contestable markets that are commonly believed to have a positive
influence on the efficiency of the systems. On the other hand, a certain degree of
cooperation is also needed so that the potential economies of scale as well as11
critical mass of users can be achieved. From regulators’ point of view, the critical
question is whether competition for the market (ie competition between systems)
or  competition in the market (ie service competition using same system or
compatible systems) would lead to the most efficient outcome.
From public authorities’ point of view, the ultimate goal in payment system
regulation (or more broadly in payment system oversight) is to ensure smooth
operation of financial markets so that social welfare can be maximised (or social
cost minimised). In the payment systems field, this goal can be achieved by
requiring and ensuring that the systems are both safe and efficient. The public
authorities’ task is challenging because there can be a certain trade-off between
safety and efficiency requirements. In fact, it is the safety requirement that is to be
fulfilled first, and only thereafter the efficiency requirement steps in. This is very
clear in large-value payment systems where systemic risk and potential disruptive
contagion effects are great. To a lesser extent, this also applies to retail payment
systems where the potential of system risk is also present, although not in so
pronounced a way as in large-value payment systems. Accordingly, the safety
requirement for retail payment systems is well recognised but, as the present study
focuses on the competition and efficiency issues in retail payment systems, the
following analysis assumes that safety requirement is fulfilled and concentrates
then purely on efficiency and competition issues.
9
                                                
9 Naturally, it must emphasised that the safety requirements pose certain constraints on the
efficiency and competition issues in payment systems eg when determining access of potential
participants in the systems. In the strict sense, the term ‘efficiency’ in this study should be read to
refer to ‘safety constrained efficiency’. For the sake of convenience, the term ‘efficiency’ is,
however, used.12
2 Institutional framework
In the European Union, cross-border retail payments and their pricing have
attracted the attention of policy-makers ever since the creation of the single
market in 1992. According to the pricing surveys by the European Commission
10,
the market operators have made hardly any progress and the prices of cross-border
payments have remained at high levels and their execution times a lot longer
compared to domestic retail payments. Several underlying background factors
have delayed the development. One of the main factors is probably the existence
of different national payments systems, which have developed within different
historical contexts, with different governance, access, pricing and transparency
traditions as well as different legislative environments. As a result, the current
retail payment infrastructure in European Union is still fragmented and it is
largely based on traditional national payment habits and characteristics. The
reasons for this situation are many-faceted. On the one hand, payment service
providers (mainly banks) have emphasised that ‘there is no business case’ to
develop and invest in new cross-border retail payment infrastructures because
there is not sufficient demand for these services. On the other hand, the authorities
and consumer associations have maintained that the current high prices are the
principal obstacle to activating and expanding the demand for these services. In
general, this situation is similar to the so-called Catch-22 dilemma
11 or the
chicken-and-egg-problem. Osterberg and Thomson (1998) have applied the
Catch-22 dilemma in the network externalities in retail payment innovations.
According to them, a consumer’s benefits from having a new payment instrument
depend on how many businesses will take it in payment. On the other hand,
merchants and service providers will refuse to invest in the systems needed to
accept the new payment instrument until they are sure that there will be enough
consumer demand to justify the expense. According to Osterberg and Thomson,
this  interdependence of demand will remain an obstacle until the innovation
achieves critical mass, either in its own time or with the authorities’ help.
At the practical level, the fragmented structure of retail payment methods and
systems in the EU countries can be clearly seen when looking at the EU payment
statistics (ECB 2002). Based on the statistics, one can distinguish giro-based
countries where credit transfers are in the dominant position and cheque-based
countries. Finland, Sweden, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium can
                                                
10 For related press releases and background reports, see the European Commission’s website:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/press/press_consumer_en.html.
11 For the original context of the dilemma, see Joseph Heller’s ‘Catch-22’, Simon and Schuster,
New York, 1961. The other interpretation of this phenomenon is the familiar chicken-and-egg
-problem (no supply thus no demand, or no demand thus no supply) which is shortly discussed in
the payment systems context in Chapter 4.1.13
be described as ‘giro-countries’ whereas in France, UK and Ireland cheques are
still dominant even though their relative share has been declining in recent years.
Generally speaking, the development of payment system infrastructures in
different countries is likely to have been influenced by some sort of path-
dependence
12 (‘history matters’) where the key ingredients are infrastructure of
service providing sector (banks), national payment traditions and legislative
environment. Each national payment system has its own membership criteria,
standards and practices that have evolved over time.
Another factor that has surely had a great influence on national development
paths, especially in the past, has been the slow and imperfect integration of the
international financial markets. Accordingly, national payment systems have been
developed to correspond with the national circumstances. However, in recent
years, global financial market integration has gained momentum (especially in
Europe because of the EMU), and the pressure to have compatible global systems
has clearly increased. A third factor affecting the development of national
payment systems is the statistical observation that ‘payment habits are slow to
change’. This applies especially to consumers
13, and, to a lesser extent, also to
enterprises. It is obvious that all these three factors have had influence on the
development of payment systems, but, only the coming years will tell, if the
recent advances in payment transfer technology, accelerating financial integration
process and strengthening global financial linkages will change the picture. In the
European Union / euro area, the introduction of euro notes and coins and potential
cross-border bank mergers along with regulatory measures is likely to accelerate
the development. However, the heterogeneity of payment methods in the EU is
still quite strong as can be seen in Figure 2.
                                                
12 The most well-known (but nowadays also disputed) example in the context of efficiency and
path-dependence is the QWERTY-keyboard system.
13 This can be clearly seen in some European countries (see Figure 2) and especially in the United
States, where the cheque continues to be an important payment medium.14
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Figure 2 supports the argument that the retail payment infrastructure in the EU (as
well as in the euro area) consists of 15 heterogeneous payment areas was valid in
year 2000, and there has not been drastic changes even thereafter. From cost-
efficiency point of view, it has been claimed that the national retail payment
systems work in an efficient way (at least when asked from the payment service
providers), even though national differences exist. For example, some countries
still rely on paper-based payment instruments whereas in other countries more
efficient electronic payment methods are already widely used. However, it is clear
that the present situation in retail payments area stands in sharp contrast to the
official aim of forming a Single Payment Area in the EU. Furthermore, it has also
been claimed that the present heterogeneity in the retail payments area can
potentially hinder the development of efficient cross-border retail payment
systems. The idea behind this argument is that the heterogeneity in payment
media demand makes it more difficult to develop truly compatible systems or one
common cross-border system because of different national needs.
In the area of large-value payments, more progress towards the Single Market
goal has been achieved; and today TARGET (Trans-European Automated Real-
time Gross settlement Express Transfer system) and Euro 1 -payment systems are
offering payment services in the EU-wide scale. However, the development in the
retail payment systems has been slow and cross-border payments today are still to
a large extent effected using traditional correspondent banking arrangements or
some club-type arrangements with limited membership. As a natural consequence,
the prices for cross-border retail payments have remained high. The Regulation of
cross-border payments in euro adopted by the European Commission was aimed
as regulatory remedy to correct the situation and facilitate the development, and it15
also led the banking sector to react and increase their development efforts. In the
next section, the roles and aims of the key parties involved in retail payment
systems in the euro area are described.
2.1 Key parties involved in the retail payment systems in
the euro area
In principle, the key parties that are involved in the development process of retail
payment systems can be grouped into three groups: (i) End-users, (ii) Payment
service providers, and (iii) Regulators. In the following, their motives and roles
are discussed. In addition, their main concerns as well as their recent actions are
presented in the European context.
(i) End-users
In retail payments, customers (ie consumers and enterprises) are the end-users of
the services. Accordingly, their adoption pattern of new payment instruments
plays an important role in shaping the future payment systems. As in many other
network industries, users’ expectations about the future usage of different
instruments affect their actual development also in retail payment systems. Often
the need for ‘coordination of expectations’ is emphasised, because users need to
form their expectations (and their respective decisions) on which technology will
be widely used by other users. The practical problem is that very often the
decision on which payment method is chosen depends on the present price and
availability of usage points of the payment instruments. When the present users
are few and price is high, the new payment medium cannot achieve the critical
mass needed to achieve economies of scale in its production and thus to survive
over the long run. In a practical context, the previous observation that ‘the
payment habits are slow to change’ is relevant when new payment methods are
introduced to customers. Moreover, the indirect pricing, which is commonly used
in many payment methods, also affects users’ adoption decisions.
Accordingly, when aiming at payment system efficiency, ‘the incentives of
payment system users’
14 play an important role in fostering efficiency of retail
payment systems. In the euro area, consumer associations have recently made
complaints against the service providers on the price discrepancies that have
                                                
14 In fact, the behaviour and usage decisions of payment system/method users finally decide which
systems survive. Therefore, along with investment incentives for payment service providers, ‘the
usage incentives for customers’ are also decisive when searching for efficiency in payment
systems.16
continued to prevail between domestic and cross-border payments, even after the
introduction of the euro as the single currency in the area.
(ii) Payment service providers
The banking sector has traditionally been and still is the main payment service
provider even though some new service providers are now emerging (see the short
discussion at the end of Section 2.2). As in any other industry, appropriate
incentives for innovation and investments (‘Need for the existence of a real
business case’ as many bankers have phrased it) are crucial when establishing
payment system infrastructure. Accordingly, without sufficient incentives, the
development of efficient infrastructure is doomed to be slow. In the context of
cross-border retail payments, the banking sector has emphasised that the slow
development of the systems was due the low demand for these payments (lack of
a real business case). However, after the adoption of the Regulation of cross-
border payments in Euro (RPE), the banking sector ‘was forced’ to act. In the
aftermath of the RPE, the banking sector activated and published a White Paper:
Euroland: Our Single Payment Area!
15. In the White paper, the banking sector
emphasises the crucial need for a pan-European payment infrastructure in order to
be able to respond to the request of the Regulation. In this context, the
development of a pan-European Clearing House with fair and open access has
been advocated. Further, the components of payment schemes (infrastructure
elements, standards, rules etc.) should be developed in a concerted way.
As a concrete reaction to the Regulation on cross-border payments in euro,
European banks and banking associations have also established a European
Payments Council (EPC) in June 2002 to represent the industry and to support the
development of the Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA). The European Payments
Council has established 5 working groups in the following areas: Payment
Instrument, Infrastructure, STP (Straight-Trough Processing), Cards and Cash.
Moreover, the European banking sector has signalled that they are prepared to
move forward the necessary harmonisation of payment systems and instruments,
as much as possible through self-regulation. In their opinion, legislation and
regulation should only be used where the sufficient harmonisation cannot be
achieved by other means.
The final aim of the EPC is to achieve a real domestic market for euro
payments, and the EPC has published the first status report on progress achieved
                                                
15 European Payments Council (2002): ‘Euroland: Our Single Payment Area!’, May 2002.
http//:www.europeanpaymentscouncil.org.17
towards the SEPA.
16 According to the EPC, European banks have already
established rigorous standards to comply with the Regulation. The EPC has
approved two market conventions that will be the key tools to meet the 1
st July
2003 deadline in the Regulation. The first convention, the CREDEURO
Convention, establishes a standard for the execution of a ‘basic’ bank-to-bank
pan-European credit transfer, which will allow participating banks to give
guarantees to their customers as regards information requirements, execution time
(3 days from acceptance to beneficiary credit), and remittance information
transmitted. The second convention, the Interbank Charging Principles (ICP)
Convention, establishes a standard procedure for achieving end-to-end certainty in
charging methods, and allowing for the instructed amount to be credited to the
beneficiary customer in full. Moreover, the EPC members have approved the Pan-
European Automated Clearing House (PEACH) as the preferred model of the
industry for credit and debit transfers. The PEACH (provided neither by a single
company, nor by a single technical system) should be ‘county neutral’, owned and
used by banks, with central banks as potential users or facilitators for technical
access. In conclusion, the EPC states that the fully integrated European payments
infrastructure will be achieved in steps. First, for credit transfers, in combination
with the existing clearing and settlement systems, then a pan-European
infrastructure, that bridges current domestic and cross-border payments, will
develop.
Additional driving forces for further developments in cross-border retail
payment field are likely to be new emerging payment initiatives. As discussed in
Section 2.2, some new payment initiatives are now emerging, but currently the
traditional payment service providers (ie banks and their associations) are still
dominating the field. It remains to be seen whether new providers will reach ‘the
critical mass’ for their systems, and thereby form new real competing entities
against the traditional payment service providers.
(iii)Regulators
In the EU/euro area, the European Commission (the Commission) and the
European Central Bank (ECB)/European System of Central Bank (ESCB) along
with competition authorities are the main regulators in the payment service field.
Their respective, partly overlapping roles, will be discussed next.
                                                
16 For the details of the first status report, see the EPC press release with links to the related
documents on 3
rd of April 2003, http://www.europeanpaymentscouncil.org.18
The European Commission
When fulfilling its role in promoting the development of the Single Market, the
European Commission has been active in facilitating financial market integration.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Commission has been arguing that high
costs for cross-border money transfers are inhibiting the Single Market
development and financial market integration. In this context, the Commission has
formulated the following objectives for the single payment area:
– to make the Internal Market the domestic market
– to promote efficient and secure payment means and systems
– to enhance customer protection and strengthen consumer confidence relating
to all payment means
– to ensure competition on equal terms in a level playing field.
In pursuing these goals, the Commission has assumed a more active role in recent
years. The fact that the charges for cross-border retail credit transfers have
remained high over the years prompted the European Parliament and the Council
to adopt Regulation (EC) No 2560/2001 on Cross-border Payments in Euro (RPE)
in December 2001. With the Regulation, the Commission aims at facilitating the
expansion of the ‘Single Market’ concept to cover the money transfers and
payment systems markets as well. The adoption of the regulation was seen as the
ultimate tool to foster the development of a market where, according to the
Commission, ‘no substantial development efforts by market participants’ was
observed before that.
The Commission is also working to harmonise the legal framework for
payment services in order to facilitate the development of the Single Payment
Area in the internal market. The Commission has drafted and recently organised a
public consultation on the working document where it has outlined the principal
ingredients and legislation needs for the Single Payment Area.
17
European Central Bank/European System of Central Banks
The ESCB/ECB’s interest in the efficiency of payment systems is based on the
Article 105(2) of the Treaty and the Article 22 of the Statute. According to these,
the ESCB shall promote the smooth operation of payment systems. This also
includes facilitating and ensuring the efficiency of payment systems. In the area of
                                                
17 European Commission (2002): A Possible Legal Framework for the Single Payment Area in the
Internal Market, Working Document, 2002.
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/payment/area/index.htm.19
retail payment systems, the Eurosystem has focused on the importance of
providing efficiency and safety standards for retail payment instruments and euro
retail payment systems with the aim of fostering the achievement of a single euro
payment area. In principle, both the safety and efficiency targets are important,
and in many cases, as in the large-value payment systems where potential for
systemic risk is bigger than in retail payments, the safety requirement is the first
one to be achieved.
18
The ECB/ESCB has communicated its policy stance on retail payment issues
by publishing various reports and studies. The ECB has published two reports
Improving Cross-Border Retail Payment Services – the Eurosystem’s view
(September 1999) and Improving Cross-Border Retail Payment Services –
Progress Report (September 2000) in which it highlighted inefficiencies and set
objectives for cross-border retail payments. Moreover, the ECB Monthly Bulletin
article in February 2001 Towards a Uniform Service Level for Retail Payments in
the Euro Area examined the variety of issue in retail payments area. In November
2001, the ECB prepared a report (at the request of the Ecofin Council) Towards
an Integrated Infrastructure for Credit Transfers in Euro, in which it reviewed
ways to remove obstacles that are the origin of the high costs of retail cross-border
credit transfers and provided an overview of measures to improve the payment
infrastructures.
Regarding the euro area development, the ECB
19 has argued that the lack of
competition among banks explains the lack of progress with regard the price level
of cross-border credit transfers, whereas the lack of co-operation on standards
and infrastructures explains the lack of progress in reducing the cost of
processing cross-border transfers. This quotation nicely reveals the ‘network
nature of payment systems’ that has strong effects on the innovation and
competition in the area. On the one hand, cooperation among service providers is
needed on establishing standards and infrastructures in order to have a large
enough customer base for their services (‘network effect’). On the other hand,
agreement on common standards increases competition and may thus reduce
service providers’ incentives for the increased compatibility (‘competition effect’).
Accordingly, the crucial question for policy-makers and regulators is to find
measurers that maximise social welfare in this type of environment.
To summarise, one of the most essential tasks in the future for all the key
parties involved in the development of retail payment systems is to strengthen
                                                
18 Here it should be emphasised that the present study concentrates on efficiency issues in retail
payment systems, and, accordingly, the safety requirements are acknowledged but they are left out
of the analysis. This is done for the sake of simplicity, even though safety requirements also have
potential effects on the cooperation and competition issues.
19 ECB (2001c): Towards an Integrated Infrastructure for Credit Transfers in Euro, November
2001.20
their cooperation so that overlapping development efforts can be avoided, and that
efforts can be focused on the most relevant issues. On regulatory side, the
cooperation between the Commission and the ECB/ESCB is crucial in order to
avoid the situation, where too extensive and overlapping regulation would act as
an impediment to the development. Furthermore, the roles of competition
authorities and other regulators (including central banks as overseers of the
payment systems) in the quest for the payment systems efficiency are not totally
clear both at the national as well as at the European level. This is likely to require
further cooperation efforts at least at the European level.
2.2 Current cross-border retail payment systems in the
euro area
In general, development in cross-border retail systems has been rather slow but
recently more progress has been achieved in the EU/euro area. Along with the
traditional correspondent bank relations, there are also a few ‘club-type systems’
to execute cross-border retail payments, mainly in the area of credit transfers. In
the following, the existing systems are described.
20
Correspondent banking
At least up until now, the formation of Monetary union has only had rather a
limited impact on the cross-border retail payments, with the exception of the
traditional correspondent banking business where the effects has been clearly
visible. The number of correspondent relationships has been diminishing, and the
correspondent banking business is adjusting to a lower activity level after the
introduction of the euro currency. At the same time, there has also been
concentration to a few major banks. The driving factors behind these
developments have been a few new payment system initiatives, technological
innovation and general financial sector consolidation. As a result of the increasing
concentration, the nature of traditional correspondent banking business has also
been changing and its general importance has diminished.
Apart from bilateral correspondent arrangements among banks, some
networks have been established between groups of banks for the purpose of
enabling customers to make low-value retail payments across borders. All of them
can be argued to be sort of ‘club arrangements’ requiring direct or indirect
                                                
20 The descriptions rely heavily on the ECB Bluebook (various issues); most recent developments
are obtained from www.finextra.com.21
participation status to the system. In the following, the main systems in this field
are described.
TIPANET
TIPANET (Transferts Interbancaires de Paiement Automatisés) is a network of
member banks from the co-operative banking sector which have set up an
arrangement for the execution of cross-border bulk payments. The respective local
payment systems can be accessed via the receiving correspondent banks. Co-
operative banks from six countries set up an association called TIPA Group, S.C
in 1993. TIPANET is a network of 11 co-operative banks from 8 countries not
only in Europe but also overseas, namely in Canada. In addition some banks have
established their own international correspondent networks, which apply
TIPANET standards, without being members of TIPA Group, S.C. For example,
German co-operative banking association has an international clearing network
with 25 partners in 18 countries. TIPANET processes credit transfers, direct debit
and cheques, of which credit transfers account for the biggest share of the
transactions processed. The settlement of payments takes place via existing
reciprocal accounts (loro and nostro accounts), which correspondents hold for
each other. The conditions for settlement are agreed bilaterally between the banks
concerned. Fees are charged individually by each participant bank. The fees are
often differentiated according to the type of customer and the way in which the
payment instructions are submitted (paper-based or in electronic form).
Eurogiro
Eurogiro was established in 1989 as a co-operation between the postal and giro
organisations to build a network for the exchange of cross-border payments. The
participants act as correspondents for each other. Eurogiro has 40 members in 38
countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and North and South America (December 2002),
and all EU countries are covered. Today, not all participants belong to the postal
bank sector; some commercial banks also act as access points in some countries.
Eurogiro processes credit transfers and cash-on-delivery orders. The payments are
executed through reciprocal accounts (loro and nostro accounts) which the
correspondents hold for each other. Eurogiro is run by Eurogiro Network A/S,
which is based in Denmark. It is a limited company and is owned by 16 European
post office banks / postal financial services companies. Eurogiro has laid down
some internal standards, which must be met by participants in order to be to
process payments via the network. Eurogiro's strategy is to provide low value
payments/bulk payments cost efficiently and create value-added services for
members of the club.22
S-Interpay
S-Interpay was set-up in 1994 by the German savings banks and their central
institutions, the Landesbanken and Girozentralen, to facilitate cross-border
payments. Since then the system has expanded and it now consists of a network of
correspondent banks in the EU and beyond. Detailed access criteria are not
published. However, participants are mainly from the savings banks sector. The
services of S-Interpay are available to all members of the European Savings Bank
Group, and in principle, also to other commercial banks. In general, one bank in
each country functions as the central correspondent for that country. The
correspondent ‘collects’ all payment orders, which are to be transferred abroad
from the participants. These payment orders are transferred to the foreign
correspondent, which will then convert the data into domestic format and process
the payment within the relevant local payment system. The network only handles
cross-border credit transfers for amounts of up to EUR 10,000.
STEP 1 (Euro Banking Association)
The STEP 1 initiative of the Euro Banking Association (EBA) entered into
operation on 20 November 2000. The main aims of STEP 1 are to enable the
reduction in the execution time of cross-border retail payment instructions, to
foster the use of industry standards for messaging in order to enhance STP within
banks and to develop and encourage the adoption of European business practices
in the execution of cross-border retail payment instructions. STEP 1 has two-tier
membership: the Euro 1 clearing members and, in addition, any other bank which
is not a member of Euro 1 but acquires a status of a STEP 1 bank and uses a Euro
1 clearing bank as a ‘settlement bank’ for its low-value payments. The EBA’s
STEP 1 arrangement is open to all banks which have a system office located in
the Member State of the EU and are either Euro 1 banks or have appointed a Euro
1 bank to act as their settlement agent within Euro1. STEP 1 uses the technical
platform of Euro 1 for the processing of low-value payments. There were 209
STEP 1 banks (STEP 1 banks and directly accessible subparticipants) in February
2003.
STEP 2 (Euro Banking Association)
The Euro Banking Association is also proceeding with the development of the
new Euro currency automated Clearing House for interbank payments, STEP 2.
The new pan-European ACH (Automated Clearing House) went live in pilot
phase in 28 April 2003 with 32 banks, and the membership is planned to be23
expanded gradually. STEP 2 provides a pan-European ACH solution for
processing bulk payments. The European Payments Council has labelled STEP 2
as a PEACH (Pan-European Automated Clearing House) and promotes strongly
the initiative. The payment orders processed in STEP 2 are commercial transfers
in euro that are non-time critical and formatted according to agreed technical
standards. STEP 2 participants have to be financial institutions having their
registered office or a branch in the EU.
Other initiatives
In general, it can be noted that new service providers are entering to the retail
payment markets currently dominated by the traditional banks and their joint
ventures as primary service providers.
21 Recently, new initiatives have been
launched in the area of retail payments, especially in card payments. For example,
Visa EU and some Swedish and Spanish banks have agreed on a Visa P2P system
in November 2002.
22 The system, known as Visa Direct, has been developed to
enable banks to comply with the Regulation on cross-border payments in euro.
Visa Direct uses Visa connections, systems and account numbers to provide banks
with a plug-and-play package for entering the European money transfer market.
To transfer money, all the sender needs to know is the email address or account
number of the recipient. Transactions may be initiated by phone, over the Web or
in person at the branch. The scheme is initially open any Visa EU cardholder but
this will be widened to other Visa regions and payment schemes in the future.
The Visa-initiative is facing competition from alternative payment systems,
such as eBay-owned PayPal, which has recently introduced sterling and euro
currency transfers, and mobile payment operators, including Paybox and
Vodafone. Furthermore, Money Remittance Offices, like Western Union, Money
Gram among others) provide cross-border cash transfer services and have
increased their corresponding agency offices. At this stage, it is difficult to predict
the future success of the new competing initiatives as new systems are being
introduced at an accelerating speed but, historically, only very few of the new
initiatives have turned out to be successful and viable. However, it can be stated
that competition from other than the traditional payment service providers is
clearly increasing. All these developments are likely to foster competition and,
thereby, facilitate improvements in efficiency in the payment service industry.
                                                
21 For a recent review of new retail payment methods in Finland and at international level, see
Jyrkönen and Paunonen (2003).
22 See Visa press release 14.11.2002: http://visaeu.com/press_release/press122.html.24
In recent years, completely new ideas for a payment system infrastructure
have also been proposed.
23 These ideas are based the utilisation of the modern
internet technology, and if applicable in the future, they will have a revolutionary
impact on the competition and contestability of the whole payment system market.
3 Retail payment systems as network industry
3.1 Definition of retail payments
According to the BIS (2002) report, retail payments can be characterised and
contrasted with other types of payments in the following way. First, retail
payments are typically made in large numbers by large numbers of transactors and
typically relate to purchases of goods and services in both the consumer and
business sectors, rather than, for example to the settlement of transactions
between financial institutions. Secondly, retail payments are made using a much
wider range of payment instruments than large value payments and in more varied
contexts, including, for example payments made in person at a point of sale as
well as for remote consumer and commercial transactions. Thirdly, retail payment
markets are characterised by extensive use of private sector systems for the
transaction process and for clearing.
The above characterisations nicely reveal the complex and many-faceted
nature of retail payments. It also points out the fact that retail payments differ
from large-value payments in many aspects. Therefore, it is useful to examine the
special characteristics of retail payments more closely before moving into
analysing the retail payment systems as a network industry.
3.2 Special characteristics of retail payments
Strong linkage to other banking services
One fundamental characteristic of retail payment services is that they are strongly
linked to other banking services, like deposits. In fact, one could argue that the
payments are not themselves final products but, instead, essential services
provided as part of general banking service. It has also been claimed that payment
services are often treated as loss leaders as part of the whole banking service
                                                
23 For an overview and description of the new payment system infrastructure proposal (the so-
called E-settlement), see Leinonen (2000); and for the technical set-up, Leinonen, Lumiala and
Sarlin (2002).25
package. This can be clearly seen eg in the pricing of payment services where
indirect pricing through cross-subsidisation is common. Payment services are
offered free or underpriced but, at the same time, they are implicitly charged
through low interest on transaction account balances.
24 This is a very important
issue because direct pricing of payment services can be used to influence
consumers’ choice of payment instruments. In fact, direct pricing of payment
services has been gaining popularity in recent years. The proponents of this direct
pricing approach have welcome this development and have stated that this has
increased the efficiency of payment systems by guiding the customers to use the
most efficient payment instruments.
25
Retail payment instruments and systems posses also other inherent features
that differentiate them from goods and services of traditional industries. In the
following, some fundamental features are shortly discussed.
26
The presence of two final customers
A typical account-based payment transfer is service provided to two final
customers: the payer making the payment and the payee receiving the payment. In
order for a payment to be executed, both the payer and payee must be able to
access the same system or compatible/interoperable payment systems. The
situation is, in principle, similar to telecommunications services where there are
also two customers.
27 The ability to make and receive payments or
telecommunications requires that the sender and recipient have access to the same
system or compatible systems. In fact, this compatibility issue is of crucial
importance in all ‘network industries’, and it will be discussed more in detail in
Section 3.3. Furthermore, the presence of two final customers also affects the
pricing of retail payment services. In principle, it allows for three different
charging options. The service can be charged to the payer (OUR), to the payee
receiving the payment (BEN) or divided between them (SHARE). In addition to
direct payments charges, charges are also levied indirectly through the practise of
offering low interest transaction accounts as discussed already above.
                                                
24 For theoretical analyses on the determination of deposit interest and bank service charges, see eg
Tarkka (1995). For issues on cost recovery and pricing in payment services, see eg Humphrey,
Keppler and Montes-Negret (1997).
25 See for example, Humphrey, Kim and Vale (2001) as well as Norges Bank (2002a) and (2002b).
26 The following part is an adapted list of features provided by Gangulny and Milne (2002a).
27 Even though similar in many aspects, the payment service and telecommunication industries do
have some fundamental differences. In principle, information is exchanged in both (telephone call
and payment information in payment message need have a compatible system through which
messages are transferred between the customers), but in payment services also the settlement of
money transfer need to take place.26
Multiple payment service providers and need for cooperation
In principle, an account-based payment may involve five different parties. In
addition to two final customers, there are two banks providing them with
transaction facilities and some interbank payment arrangement (payment system)
for effecting the settlement between the two banks. In this kind of environment,
interesting cooperation and competition puzzle arises. The operation of the
interbank payment arrangements and the determination of interbank charges
require cooperation among banks but, at the same time, they are competitors in
most aspects of their business. This brings competition policy considerations into
the picture. In principle, it is possible that a group of dominant banks operates
payment systems and sets payment charges so as to restrict or even rule out new
entrants. It may also be argued that, even if payment systems are not operated so
as to create barriers to entry in payment provision, cooperation between banks
may still result in pricing structures that are unfavourable to consumers.
Interdependence of investment decisions
Investment decisions on new payment systems are also influenced by the special
characteristics of the industry. Cooperation requirement in payment service
provision along with the usage externalities for customers (a widely accepted
payment instrument is more attractive to customers) leads to a situation in which
investment returns depend on the level of investment made by other banks and
businesses. Another implication of these investment interdependencies is that the
private rate of return to investment may be very much lower than the social rate of
return. In principle, when everybody is making investments on his own, the
potential externalities cannot be internalised as in the case of cooperative joint
ventures. Accordingly, it is very likely that the absence of payment service joint
ventures (based on the lack of cooperation among service providers or restrictions
set by regulatory authorities) can potentially lead to ‘underinvestment’ that can
only be corrected by providing a more favourable investment environment eg by
tolerant regulation. In the extreme case, the public sector could also provide the
infrastructure needed given the ‘public good nature’ of payment systems,
especially in the field of retail payments. This view could also be supported by the
‘universal service obligation’ -requirement and non-discrimination principle (ie
‘everybody should get access to systems’). However, it should be noted that it is
not clear, how the public intervention would affect the payment systems safety
and efficiency requirement; and, perhaps even more importantly, the general
market contestability.27
Ownership through private joint ventures or public sector
Commonly retail payment systems are jointly owned by participating banks or
they are in public ownership (central bank).
28 The mutual ownership (eg in the
form of joint ventures) reflects the cooperative nature of payment provision
services. The ownership structure can play an important role in the access to the
system especially if some sort of exclusivity rights are used. Therefore, the
ownership question must be carefully dealt with in order to provide ‘a level
playing field’ to all market players. However, another aspect that is related to
ownership and access to payment systems is safety. Totally open access to a
payment system may endanger the smooth working of the system if some of the
participants cannot fulfil their obligations as required. In fulfilling their statutory
role in payment system oversight, central banks are obliged to take all the
necessary actions to limit the contagion effects of systemic risk inherent in all
payment systems, including retail payment systems. Accordingly, along with the
efficiency requirements, the safety issues must also be taken into account in
ownership and access considerations.
3.3 Network effects in retail payment systems
The importance of network characteristics has been recognised in many modern
industries like transportation and communications industries among others. The
development of systematic framework for their analysis was started in mid 1980s
by Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Farrell and Saloner (1986).
29 A central feature of
networks is that network goods or services exhibit network externalities (also
called network effects by some authors).
30 In a nutshell, this means that adding
another customer adds value to the existing customers of the network. In this
context, the telephone or fax system has often been used as a demonstrative
example. Many authors have argued that networks play an integral part also in
financial markets and in payment systems. For example, McAndrews (1997a)
analyses network effects in payment systems and he defines a network good or
service as having two main characteristics:
                                                
28 For a recent survey and analysis on the roles of central banks in payment services provision, See
Khiaonarong (2003).
29 For an analysis of the basic structures of networks see eg Economides (1996). Economides has
also done extensive research in many areas of network industries: see eg Economides and Salop
(1992), Economides (1993), Economides, Lopomo and Woroch (1996), Economides (1996),
Economides and Flyer (1997).
30 This study uses both terms (network externality and network effect) in interchangeable way.28
(i) the value a person gets from the product increases as more people consume it
(ii) the technique a firm chooses to produce the product will depend on technique
chosen by other firms.
Both these characteristics can be identified in the retail payment service provision.
Concerning point (i), the more widely a payment instrument is accepted, the more
benefits it brings to a consumer using it (demand side externality). Concerning
point (ii), economies of scale in production of payment services foster the
industry’s willingness for cooperation (common standards, joint network
ownership) in providing these services (supply side externality). Naturally, both
these characteristics cannot be observed in their pure forms in real life. However,
for example, in the adoption process of ATM-networks and payment cards they
clearly have played a major role.
Complementarity, compatibility and standards
In network markets, there are complementarities between users and/or products,
which give rise to network externalities. Network externalities can be classified
into two types: direct and indirect externalities (Katz and Shapiro 1985,
Economides 1996). For direct network externalities, the complementarities exist
between users of the same product or service, and for indirect network
externalities, the complementarities exist between products or services in different
markets. In other words, direct network externalities are generated through the
direct effects of the number of the agents consuming the same product, whereas
indirect network externalities arise when the value of product increases as the
number of the complementary goods or services increases (sometimes also
referred to as ‘the hardware-software paradigm’).
In retail payment systems complementarity plays an important role. For
example, in credit card systems the complementarity is straightforward: as more
people use credit cards, more merchants are induced to add terminals, since
allowing customers a convenient means of payment will potentially increase their
sales, and as more merchants permit card payment, the value of to the customer of
having a credit card increases too (McAndrews, 1997a). At the system level,
compatibility is of crucial importance in enabling interoperability of systems (very
clearly eg in ATM-systems).
Along with complementarity, compatibility between products is also essential
for the existence of network externalities. In essence, for complementarities to be
exploited, interaction channels are needed: products, users or systems need to
interact. This means that complementary products or systems must operate on the
same or compatible standard. According to Economides (1996), it is compatibility
that makes complementarity actual and is thus crucial in network industries. In29
payment systems, compatibility can, in principle, be achieved by adherence to
technical standards. However, it should be emphasised that ‘technical
compatibility’ does not necessarily mean that different systems or actors can truly
interact. The interaction can be limited by exclusivity arrangements that hinder or
restrict the interaction. What is also needed is ‘commercial compatibility’ that
ensures that technically compatible products or systems really can interact
because it is possible to limit the technical compatibility by eg rules and entry
requirements of systems.
The process of setting standards for network components is vital to achieving
the compatibility that makes network complementarity fully possible.
31 According
to McAndrews (1997a), setting standards can be done by the market place,
through co-operation (industry forums on setting standards), or by authorities. In
payment systems, compatibility can be achieved by agreement on common
technical standards, infrastructural arrangements or through interbank cooperation
(eg as in ‘payment clubs or common systems’ discussed in Section 2.2). In many
retail payment systems (most clearly eg in credit transfer systems), standards have
traditionally been set ‘domestically’ by national authorities and/or banking
associations, and as a consequence, domestic retail payment systems work rather
efficiently in many countries. At cross-border level, standardisation has been more
problematic on the one hand, because of higher number of different parties
involved and, on the other hand, because of strict adherence to the adopted
domestic standards in different payment methods.
32 At the international level,
SWIFT (the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) has
been successful in developing and implementing internationally accepted
standards for interbank payments. At the European level, the European Committee
for Banking Standards (ECBS) has been developing and advocating IBAN
(International Bank Account Number) and IPI (International Payment Instruction)
standards.
33 An obvious drawback in the work of the ECBS has been the fact that
it lacks the power of enforcing the adoption of the formulated standards. In this
regard, any standard, no matter how excellent it might be in improving the
efficiency of the payment systems, is of little value when it is not adopted by a
sufficiently large service provider group. However, the recent establishment of the
European Payment Council (EPC) is likely to foster the concentrated effort of
setting and adopting common standards in European payment traffic. The
authorities can also play a role in standard setting process. For example, the
                                                
31 For a review of key policy aspects of standard setting in industries with network effects, see
Gandal (2002).
32 In this context, it should be emphasised that international card payment networks, like eg Visa
and Mastercard, stand in sharp contrast to the previous statement that, however, fits well to the
development of international credit transfer standards.
33 For more information on the IBAN and IPI standards as well as other standardisation projects,
see the homepage of the European Committee for Banking Standards www.ecbs.org.30
ECB/ESCB has emphasised its role as the catalyst for the development in the
European payment system standardisation process. A natural way for central
banks to support efficiency improving standards is to require their usage in their
own payment systems.
Economies of scale in production
Many network industries are subject to economies of scale in production due the
significant investment in infrastructure needed to start the operation (large fixed
costs) and a relatively small marginal cost for services produced over the existing
infrastructure. As in the case of traditional industries, this supports the existence
of large production units. It is often argued that payment systems are subject to
economies of scale because of the significant investment in infrastructure needed
to start the operation (large fixed costs) and a relatively small marginal cost for
services produced over the existing infrastructure. This argument is of relevance
eg for electronic payment transfers processed by a clearing house where critical
mass of payments is seen as a prerequisite for the establishment of such system. It
should, however, also be stressed that it is possible that new solutions for future
payment systems (eg internet-based systems) may change this situation.
34
Consumption externalities and expectations
A consumption externality can be defined as the increasing utility that a user
derives from consumption of a product as the number of other users who consume
the same product increases (some authors have labelled this as ‘demand side
economies of scale’). In network industries, consumers’ expectations about the
future size of the network play an important role in the actual size that the
network achieves. This means that expectations are in fact often self-fulfilling. In
retail payment services, these consumption externalities also clearly exist. Any
payment system, like a giro system, is of no value for a customer if no other
customer is participating in the system. Expectations of the future size of the
payment network are also crucial, and the difficulty of achieving a critical mass of
users tends to limit the adoption of new payment instruments.
35
                                                
34 See Leinonen (2000) and Leinonen et al (2002).
35 See eg Guibourg (1998).31
Switching costs
In network industries, consumers and firms often have to face costs if they are
willing to switch from one network to another. If high enough, these switching
costs may effectively lock the users to the existing system and provide barriers
that prevent them from entering into another network. Switching cost may lead to
inefficiency by preventing users from adopting a new superior technology. Shy
(2001) argues that switching costs affect price competition in two opposing ways.
First, if consumers are already locked-in using specific products, firms may raise
prices knowing that consumers will not switch unless the price difference exceeds
the switching cost to a competing brand. Second, if consumers are not locked-in,
brand-producing firms will compete intensively by offering discounts and free
complementary products and services in order to attract consumers who later on
will be locked in the technology.
Switching costs are also present in the payment service industry, at least in an
indirect way. According to Shy (2001), switching costs can be significant in many
service industries including banking. From the customers’ point of view, the cost
associated with switching between banks (ie closing an account in one bank, and
opening an account and switching the activities to a different bank) could reach 6
per cent of the average account balance (Finnish data). Accordingly, some sort of
lock-in effect may prevent customers from frequently switching among banks and
payment service providers. Also from the payment service providers’ point of
view, switching costs can also be significant: eg upgrading or changing to a new
payment system may require large investments in computer systems and training.
3.4 A brief review of related research
The literature on network effects in retail payment systems is not very large, and
most of the research is conducted by just a few authors. This literature is briefly
discussed below.
Early studies of network effects in retail payment systems were empirical
studies in the area of credit card and ATM networks. Carlton and Frankel (1995)
focus on whether intrasystem competition or intersystem competition is socially
more beneficial. Their analysis suggests that the society’s welfare does not
entirely depend on the number of competing networks in the market. In case of
ATM networks, the authors reported increasing volumes and declining costs after
the merger of the competing ATM systems. According to them, the potential
benefits of intrasystem competition should be taken into account in the antitrust
considerations.32
Saloner and Shephard (1995) test for the existence and magnitude of network
externalities in the rate of adoption of ATM technology. They examine whether
the two findings – (i) a network’s value increases in the number of locations it
serves (the ‘network effect’) and (ii) the number of its users (the ‘production scale
effect’) – in the network economics literature can be observed on banks’
adoptions of automated teller machines. They use U.S. data and find that these
effects have an important effect on the adoption decision for ATM technology.
They argue that the main finding is that banks with many branches adopt ATMs
earlier than banks with fewer branches, adjusting for the number of depositors.
Furthermore, an ATM network is more valuable to depositors when it has many
geographically dispersed ATMs because of the convenience it provides.
Theoretical modelling of network effects in retail payment systems is
presented in McAndrews and Rob (1996). They study ATM networks and model
the competition for members between wholesale switches and the role joint
ownership can play in attracting members. They stress the following features of
the industry. First, the vertical structure of production: firms in downstream
industry (banks) serve end-users (customers) and buy network (switch) services
from upstream firms. Second, the upstream industry exhibits economies of scale
on the production side as well as network externalities from the demand side. In
this set up, they compare competition between two solely owned switches with
competition between one solely owned and one jointly owned switch. According
to McAndrews and Rob, the key finding is that the joint ownership of the
wholesale switch eliminates the double marginalization. Moreover, the joint
ownership results in more concentrated markets, in which the network externality
is more fully exploited. The jointly owned networks also possess an advantage
over solely owned networks in that they achieve critical mass with smaller
membership. Furthermore, McAndrews and Rob also identify costs to joint
ownership and are able to draw two conclusions. First, the costs of decision-
making in a jointly owned facility are likely to be higher than in a solely owned
one. Second, the costs of raising capital are likely to be higher as well. Hence,
quickly adapting to technical changes that require large capital investments might
be more problematic for a jointly owned switch.
In a related study McAndrews (1996a) analyses the pricing in vertically
integrated network switches in the context of ATM networks. He utilises the
framework of McAndrews and Rob (1996) where a group of downstream retail
banks own and operate the upstream network switch and models the pricing and
output behaviour of the group of owners as the number of its members varies. He
draws two conclusions. Firstly, the more inclusive is the ownership group in the
vertically integrated network, the more likely the network adopts a flat fee pricing
schedule. Secondly, the output of the downstream industry initially rises as the
ownership group expands, but then contracts as the ownership group includes all
of the downstream firms (ie joint venture becomes overinclusive).33
McAndrews (1996b) presents a model of wholesale and retail fee setting for
ATM network services. He shows that that retail ATM fees are dependent on the
demand-side network effect and economies of scale in production of the services.
These, in turn, are functions of the size of the ATM network. The ATM fees are
regressed on the ATM network size and other variables (like state income and
banking market concentration) in a reduced form estimation. His results suggests
that both network effects in demand and economies of scale influence retail ATM
network service fees, with economies of scale becoming dominant for the largest
ATM networks.
Guibourg (2001) analyses the causes and extent of network externalities in the
EFTPOS market (Electronic Funds Transfer at the Point Of Sale). She conducts
an empirical analysis of network effects on the EFTPOS markets (G-10 countries,
Australia and the Nordic countries). She concludes that the degree of market
concentration and the degree of interoperability (the use of common standards)
are crucial variables in the exploitation of network externalities. She also
examines the trade-off between competition effects and network effects and
shows that the more symmetric banks are in acquiring the market, the more likely
the common standards are adopted. However, the larger the gains from
differentiation, ie the stronger the competition effects in relation to network
effects, the more likely is the adoption of different standards.
Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2002) analyse the causes and extent of network
externalities for ACH-electronic payments using a quarterly panel data set on
individual bank adoption and usage of ACH. Their data consist of an 11-quarter
panel (1995:Q2 to 1997:Q4) of the number of ACH transactions for financial
institutions that purchased ACH services from the Federal Reserve. They develop
three methods of identifying network externalities. The first method identifies
network externalities from the clustering of ACH adoption. The second method
identifies them by examining whether banks in areas with higher market
concentration or larger competitors are likely to adopt ACH. The third method
identifies them by examining whether ACH adoption by smaller branches of large
banks affects the adoption by local competitors. According to Gowrisankaran and
Stavins, all three identification methods reveal significant evidence of network
externalities (more clearly at the bank level than at the individual customer level)
and the magnitude of network externalities is estimated to be moderately large.
Based on their results, the authors draw two policy implications. First, because
ACH is underused relative to its socially optimal usage level, the Federal reserve
should attempt to encourage ACH adoption and usage. Second, other high-
technology industries may also be characterised by network externalities.34
4 Retail payment networks and public policy
According to the BIS (2002) report, it is widely recognised that safe and efficient
retail payment systems and instruments are in the public interest, because they
contribute towards the broader effectiveness of the financial system, in particular
to consumer confidence and to the smooth and efficient functioning of commerce.
Furthermore, public authorities can influence on the efficiency of retail payment
systems by applying competition and regulatory measures. In this context, the
challenge for public authorities is to take into account the fact that the network
characteristics of the retail payment industry do have very strong implications for
the general performance of the market, and thereby also on the effectiveness of
their regulatory measures and actions. Accordingly, this section first concentrates
on the market structure issues in network industries like tipping, excess
inertia/momentum, path-dependence and underproduction, and assess them in the
context of retail payment systems. Thereafter, standardisation issues are examined
both from the theoretical and technical aspects. The analysis continues with a
discussion of joint ventures and antitrust issues in retail payment systems. In the
last section, regulatory tools used in network industries are presented and their
applicability in retail payments is briefly assessed.
4.1 Market structure issues in payment networks
As stressed in the earlier chapters, the vertical structure of the industry is common
in retail payment markets. Accordingly, the basic industry framework can be
generalised as follows:
36
Payment service providers (banks) compete directly in the provision of retail
payments instruments and services to end-users but, at the same time, they
also co-operate in shared payment networks.
In other words, it can also be said that there is ‘upstream cooperation combined
with downstream competition’. This poses several challenges to public
authorities, because from efficiency standpoint, it is desirable to take advantage of
economies of scale by means of cooperation between market players, but, at the
same time, there is a risk that such arrangements may end up to be anti-
competitive. From a competition policy point of view, cooperation at one level
may lead to collusive behaviour also at the other level. This is the crucial point in
assessing the trade-off between competition and cooperation. Straightforward
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application of economic theory to this question will need to be supplemented by
taking into account the external environment factors. Without careful scrutiny, it
is impossible to say ex ante whether competition in the market or competition for
the market leads to the most efficient outcome.
According to the BIS (2002) report, market competition or contestability is
the main route to maintaining efficiency in the retail payments markets. As
emphasised above, a particular characteristic of these markets is that competition
among market participants needs to coexist with the mutual cooperation that is
required in the context of their participation in certain infrastructure arrangements.
In this context, a key issue is whether the market participants by themselves
achieve an adequate balance between competition and cooperation to benefit
market users. In other words, public authorities should consider whether the
market structure supports innovation and new market entrants and whether
existing access restrictions serve to promote or impede competition and
contestability.
Commonly cooperation is required among market participants in the context
of their participation in certain infrastructure arrangements that also possess some
of the characteristics of public utility. The issue in such cases is whether this
cooperation results in support competition for improvements in overall market
efficiency. The BIS (2002) report argues further that established networks are a
typical context in which this issue will arise. On the one hand, they have the
potential to provide a stepping stone for innovation, but, on the other hand, they
are also in a position to create entry barriers that impede competition and
innovation. Entry barriers can be created either by imposing access restrictions or
by more indirect means, for example by a choice of standards and rules that are
inappropriate, difficult or costly for other initiatives to adopt. The rationale for
such choices is likely, at least in part, to reflect a desire to protect the franchise.
A related question is whether competition between different systems or
competition in one system is better for overall market efficiency. If excluded
entrants to a particular system decided to establish their own system that is more
efficient and they are also able to attract enough customers (critical mass) for the
new system to survive, market efficiency will be better. However, if they do not
succeed, the customers of the excluded entrants will surely leave them and
become customers of the existing system. This clearly points out the importance
of market dynamics in network industries that strongly affects the market
structure. In the following, some key market dynamics implications in network
industries are discussed.36
Tipping
A peculiar, network industry specific effect, ‘tipping’
37 (a dominance of one
network service provider) can also be seen in retail payment systems. At the
national level, it is common that only one major retail payment system exists. In
some cases, two or more systems may exist in parallel but they are often dedicated
to different payment instruments (paper-based vs electronic).
38 The existence of
one dominant system is normally explained by the economies of scale in
production as well as positive demand side externalities. However, heterogeneity
in demand for different payment instruments may facilitate the existence of more
than one system.
Excess inertia / excess momentum
Network markets also may tend to get locked-in to obsolete standards or
technologies (excess inertia). Users tend to stick with an established technology
even when total surplus would be greater were they to adopt a new but
incompatible technology (Katz and Shapiro, 1994). Today’s consumers may be
reluctant to adopt a new technology if they must bear the cost of transition from
one technology to the next, and if most of the benefits of switching will accrue to
future users (Farrell and Saloner, 1986). According to Katz and Shapiro (1994)
network markets may also exhibit the opposite of excess inertia, which they call
‘insufficient friction’ (sometimes also referred to as excess momentum). In this
case, the market may be biased in favour of a new, superior, but incompatible
technology. Katz and Shapiro call the reason as ‘stranding’: today’s buyers may
ignore the costs they impose on yesterday’s buyers by adopting a new and
incompatible technology. Accordingly, those who previously bought the old
technology are stranded. Both effects are also possible in payment service
markets, but as in many network markets, excess inertia is claimed to be the
dominant characteristic. A clear example is the slow development of e-money
adoption where the service providers have long waited for its start-up but
customers have been reluctant to start to use it. In most of the EU countries, the
usage of e-money has been low: Luxembourg, Belgium and Denmark reporting
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from more conventional markets and affect the strategies that firms pursue. Network markets are
often ‘tippy’: the coexistence of incompatible products may be unstable, with a single winning
standard dominating the market (tipping). The dominance of the VHS videocassette recorder
technology and the virtual elimination of its Betamax rival is often used as an example.
38 In practical considerations, the choice faced by a customer is card vs credit transfer in giro-
countries and card vs cheque in cheque-countries.37
the highest figures 6,3%, 3,6% and 1,0% respectively of total volume of cashless
transactions, others countries below 1 per cent (ECB 2002).
Path dependence
In network markets history matters: network market equilibria often cannot be
understood without knowing the pattern of technology adoption in the earlier
periods.
39 This means that the effects of decisions by early adopters on the
decisions of later adopters are often significant in network markets. Because
buyers want compatibility with the installed base, better products that arrive later
may be unable to displace poorer, but earlier products and standards. In payment
systems, path dependence can be seen in the development of national payment
systems and, especially, in the slow change of national payment habits. In the EU,
the division of giro- and cheque countries has prevailed even though the countries
have had access to the same payment technology – at least in recent years.
Environmental factors, like legislation and regulation, may have also contributed
to this phenomenon. Consequently, the Commission has started efforts to
harmonise the legislative environment in financial market in the member
countries. However, path dependence may still play a role in the world where
payment habits are slow to change.
Critical mass and chicken-and-egg problem
Critical mass or installed base of network facilities plays a crucial role in the start
up and growth of a network. The start up problem is often referred to as the
‘chicken-and-egg’ problem: many consumers are not interested in purchasing the
good because the installed base is too small, and the installed base is too small
because an insufficiently small number of consumers have purchased the good.
40
Consumers’ expectations of the future size of the network have thus an important
role in the actual size the network achieves. According to Katz and Shapiro
(1985), the growth of network can be self-fulfilling in nature. In the payment area,
the slow adoption of e-money schemes serves again as a good example.
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Underproduction
Network effects may also lead to possible underproduction of network goods or
services. According to McAndrews (1997a), the market production of network
services may often be inefficiently low because using a network imposes an
external effect on other users of network, an effect these other users typically
disregard in making their own production decisions. For example, when deciding
whether to join a service network (buying a fax machine is often used as an
example), consumers do not take into account the benefit to other users of the
resulting larger network. Accordingly, the equilibrium network size is smaller
than the social optimum, when social benefits of joining a network exceed the
private benefits. In the payment systems area, where economies of scale are
claimed to be present at least in the electronic payments, a few authors (eg
Gowrisankaran and Stavins, 2002) have argued that the underproduction is the
most relevant problem and it should be corrected eg by actions of relevant
authorities.
4.2 Standardisation issues
As in any communication industry, standardisation issues are of importance in the
retail payment industry as well. In fact, standard setting is one of the most critical
aspects of payment system design and operation. In essence, all payment systems
must set certain standards for accepting and processing payment instructions. The
BIS (2000) report defines technical standards, business standards and
interoperability standards in the following way.
1) Technical standards
Technical standards establish common rules with respect to features of
payment instruments or systems, for example rules with respect to message
formats or communication protocols used in the exchange of payment
information. For the development of payment systems, technical standards
play an important role. The common agreement on technical standards for
retail payments is important both at domestic and, especially, at the
international level for smooth functioning of all type of payments (including
cross-border payments).39
2) Business standards
Business standards are agreements, often by means of legal contract, between
providers of payment instruments and systems that stipulate the procedures,
legal interpretation, and/or technical standards to be adopted as common
guidelines or rules for the interbank transaction, clearing and settlement
process.
3) Interoperability standards
Providers of payment services may choose to cooperate beyond the level of
applying the same business standards. They may decide to allow the
reciprocal use payment instruments by means of an agreement on
interoperability. The degree of cooperation can vary from acting as a remote
mailbox (sending all instruments and payments immediately to the issuing
institution) to acting fully on behalf of the issuing institution (actually
performing part of the processing of the payment).
In general, standards can have several positive effects on efficiency and
competition. Agreements on the technical standards can lead to lower
development and operational costs for processing payments. Standards can also
facilitate compatibility that can enable consumers and providers to choose the best
technology available, thereby favouring an optimal path of development of
technology. According to the BIS (2000) report, full compatibility between
different providers’ standards may lead to a large installed base for that
technology. However, setting standards is a complicated process and it can
potentially bring along several problems as well. First, the premature adoption of
a standard may cause a technology to become ‘locked-in’ because of the difficulty
of switching to a new and more efficient technology. Second, it can lead to
excessive delay in choosing a standard as alternative producers compete to
become the market-leading standard. Third, agreements on standards, in some
cases, can be used to limit competition in particular markets. Accordingly, it can
be concluded that standardisation has both positive and negative effects on
competition and efficiency, and these effects are likely to differ depending on
whether static or dynamic efficiency is looked at. General effects of
standardisation are discussed more thoroughly at the end of this subchapter.
According to McAndrews (1997a), standards can be set by (i) market place,
(ii) industry forums for setting standards or (iii) government (regulator). Market
players are likely to have the best knowledge in the field, and, therefore, standards
set by them (cases (i) and (ii)) are likely to lead most efficient outcomes.
Regulators may have the disadvantage of having less accurate information and,40
therefore, be prone to choose inferior standards. The advantage of the regulator
setting the standards is that the standards can be set relatively quickly, whereas
market players may end up in a long bargaining process before being able to agree
on the common standard.
41
In practice, standard setting involves both the defining and implementing the
standards. Definition of standards as such can be a lengthy process involving a lot
of bargaining by different interest groups. After the definition of standards, their
implementation can take time as well and sometimes their enforcement may even
require measures by public authorities. If some sort of market failure or slow
progress by market participants is detected, intervention by regulatory authorities
is needed. However, the because of market dynamics that are likely to lead rather
extreme market structures especially in the network industries, it may well be
difficult to judge whether the current problem is really a market failure or not.
Standards to the payment service industry are often formulated in some sort of
standard setting bodies in which the service providers are represented. This has
worked rather well at national levels, and now further efforts are also made at the
international level. For example, in the European Union, the European Committee
on Banking Standards (ECBS) has made progress in developing the standards for
the International Bank Account Number (IBAN) and for the International
Payment Instruction (IPI). However, it can be argued that, because the ECBS
lacks any enforcement power, the adoption of these standards has been rather
slow even though, at least the IBAN, could facilitate a lot the execution process of
cross-border payments. In the EU, only after the regulatory intervention by the
Commission (Regulation on the Cross-border Payments in Euro, RPE), the
adoption process has gained a momentum. Accordingly, this provides some
positive evidence on the effects of regulatory intervention by public authorities in
facilitating the implementation of the common standards.
Standards and competition
According to Besen and Farrell (1994), standardisation is a process where firms
explicitly or implicitly agree to make their products compatible. Agreeing on a
standard may eliminate competition between technologies, but it does not
eliminate competition altogether. Instead, it channels it into different and more
conventional dimensions, such as price, service and product features. A
fundamental question for firms facing horizontal competition in a network market
is whether inter-technology competition to become a standard (competition for the
market) will be less or more profitable than the ordinary intra-technology
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competition to be expected (competition in the market) if rivals’ product are
compatible. Moreover, Shapiro (2000) argues that standards shift the locus of
competition: incompatible systems compete for the market, whereas compatible
products compete in the market.
In retail payment systems, cooperative standard setting enhances
compatibility through an industry-wide standard and thereby consumers will
benefit from strengthened network effects. On the other hand, standardisation
constrains product variety and possibly limits available paths for innovation
intended to create future technology generations. Furthermore, with coordinated
standard setting, there could also be an increased risk of cooperation being
extended to the product market stage (Martin, 1996). In retail payment systems,
this could lead to a collusive behaviour in the pricing of payment transactions.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the standardisation in international retail
payment industry is generally at rather a low level (card payments being an
exception), compared with the mobile telephone industry for example. In the
mobile telephone industry the SMS-standard is widely accepted whereas eg in
retail credit transfers a commonly and widely accepted standard is still lacking
although progress has been made recently – at least in the European Union. The
reasons for the slow development are numerous. One is probably the age or
maturity of the industry and, as a consequence, the previously described path-
dependence argument. To put it very strongly, one can argue that the mobile
phone industry started some decades ago from scratch whereas the payment
service industry has long roots and national payment systems have been
developed in their somewhat isolated and divergent domestic regulatory and
legislative environments. In retail payments, national standards have been
developed and adopted, and it has proved to be difficult to find uniform
international standards that would be directly accepted by many countries.
Moreover, in retail payment system field, investments already made in old
systems may restrain participants’ willingness to invest in new systems or upgrade
old systems because of the large sunk costs. Finally, also the number and
heterogeneity of service providers is much larger in retail payments than in
telecommunication field which, in turn, is likely to make it more difficult reach an
international consensus on the standards.
4.3 Role of joint ventures and shared networks
While competition among sellers of goods and services generally yields the most
efficient outcome, markets with network externalities may benefit from42
cooperation among providers of the underlying service or good.
42 Given the
special characteristics of retail payments (see section 3.2), joint ventures and
shared ownership are inherently important in payment networks. The reasons for
this are obvious. Firstly, joint ventures make it easier to achieve the critical mass
when the network is established. Secondly, joint ventures help in the utilisation of
the potential economies of scale in production. For example, when new banks
participate in the payment network, the participants can share the costs of
network. Also the transaction volumes increase, allowing for better utilisation of
economies of scale in production. All these arguments would support the
existence of joint ventures and shared networks without any stronger regulatory
intervention.
However, the case for retail payment systems is in practice more complicated
than the simplified description above. As stated earlier, in payment systems,
service providers have some inherent incentives to work together because this
collaboration often results in efficiency for the payment system, but there is
nothing to guarantee that such form of ownership will reduce the problem of
monopoly pricing. For example, McAndrews and Rob (1996) have found that
there is a positive correlation between the degree of monopoly in a given payment
network and shared ownership. Accordingly, the potential danger of abusing
market power is clearly present and complicates the decision-making of
regulatory authorities substantially. When limiting cooperation in order to
eliminate the potential abuse of market power, the regulator should also bear in
mind that unexploited positive network externalities could also imply efficiency
losses. This could happen for example, when the size of networks is limited by
regulators to foster intersystem competition. Based on the above, one can
conclude that a decision over allowing joint ventures depends on whether the
regulator prefers intersystem competition or intrasystem competition.
43 When
making the decision, the external environment is also of importance; does it
hinder or favour competition and market contestability? This cannot be answered
without taking all the external factors, including market structure and competition
legislation among others, into account.
Other aspects related to the role of joint ventures and market efficiency are
also of relevance. For example, according to Guibourg (1998), joint ownership
can have a positive effect on technological development. She argues that, when
strategic decisions on technological innovation must be made, consumers’
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Röller et al, 2000).
43 For a general discussion on the issues related to the competition and microeconomic policy, see
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expectations about the range of system are decisive. If companies must rely on
unilateral decisions, it may take a long time before new technology is introduced.
Furthermore, the old system already has an installed base, which is rarely
compatible with the new technology. In principle, everyone would like to switch
to superior technology, but wants a sufficient number of others to switch first.
Joint ownership or joint development projects may have a positive effect on
market expectations about the spread of new technology. Another important
aspect in joint ventures is their governance and the decision-making procedures.
For the adoption of new innovations, it has been argued that the joint ventures
often ‘move at pace of slowest’. It has also been stated that the decisions are
commonly dictated by the largest shareholders to protect their interests. Finally,
the antitrust issues may become more pronounced in joint ventures, and these will
be analysed next.
4.4 Antitrust issues in payment systems
Carlton and Frankel (1995) argue that joint ventures, particularly those involving
networks that contain many industry participants, present some of the most
interesting and difficult antitrust issues. Along with many beneficial effects for
customers, payment networks may also be able to engage in collective actions that
allow their members to exercise market power. Because networks often exhibit
significant economies of scale, rival systems may not exist or may be unable to
constrain the dominant system’s pricing significantly. Moreover, economies of
scale can make it hard for a relatively small network to compete and grow if the
dominant network is significantly larger. In this set-up, the question is whether
competition between networks is needed and an antitrust intervention against
dominant network is grounded. According to Carlton and Frankel, antitrust
intervention should take place only when the economic effects of intervention are
well understood and there is clear evidence that benefits (efficiency improvements
through increased competition) from intervention outweighs the harm (loss in the
utilisation of economies of scale).
In general, the goal of antitrust legislation is to maximise the benefits society
obtains from competition (or minimise the losses from the lack of competition).
Payment systems networks that are formed as joint ventures by competing
financial institutions, like other type of joint ventures, present difficult antitrust
issues because competing firms must cooperate to provide the service. Some
authors have stated that the way to resolve these difficult issues is to use antitrust
intervention to ensure that multiple payment networks remain separate and
compete with one another (competition for the market). However, Carlton and
Frankel (1995) argue that this simple policy recommendation is inadequate.44
Instead, a thorough analysis of the competitive effects of any proposed antitrust
intervention in these networks must be done before such intervention in these can
be justified on the grounds of increasing society’s welfare. In essence, this clearly
points out the difficulty in judging theoretically whether competition between
systems (competition for the market) or competition in one system (competition in
the market) is better for society’s welfare on whole. As a consequence, before any
antitrust intervention, the specific market environment should first be studied and
taken into account.
In network industries, access and exclusion considerations have received a lot
of attention because of the nature of industry. For example, Balto (1995, 1999)
argues that exclusivity arrangements have been at issue in some of the most
important joint venture and network antitrust decisions. He categorises the
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of joint network exclusivity as follows.
Anticompetitive effects of network exclusivity
1. Foreclosure of new entrants
2. Enhancement of the ability to exercise market power
3. Enhancement of opportunity for cartel activity
4. Deterrence of innovation
Procompetitive effects of network exclusivity
1. Promoting network competition
2. Encouraging promotional services by preventing free-riding
3. Reducing supply and demand uncertainty
4. Recovering network investments.
As stated already earlier, the most important task for the regulator is to define
which of the above effects are stronger in the situation that is analysed. Even
though originally not tailor-made for payment system issues, the above list can be
used in determining the importance of network exclusivity in that field as well.
However, the most difficult task is to evaluate each of sub-items in quantitative
terms and then strike the overall balance.
Balto (1999) further discusses the procedure of how to apply antitrust analysis
of network exclusivity. He puts down the procedure as follows:
A. Careful scrutiny of market power: defining relevant markets
B. Analysis of market power
C. Realistic assessment of de facto exclusivity.45
In principle, this methodology can be applied to assessment of exclusivity in
payment systems where the definition of relevant markets plays a crucial role.
This especially important when thinking of cross-border payment market, like the
euro area, where national borders should not play a role any more. Furthermore,
as in any ‘network exclusivity assessment’, the quantitative analysis of market
power, as well as assessment of de facto exclusivity, remains ultimately somewhat
a subjective decision even though economic theory can provide some guidance in
the assessment.
4.5 Regulatory tools in network industries
Regulatory tools in network industries rely on the regulation theory developed for
the regulation of natural monopolies and oligopolies. In network industries, firms
having economies of scale in production and facing consumption externalities,
can obtain substantial market power in the absence of regulation. In essence, the
aim of regulation is to provide ‘a fair framework’ (‘or a level playing field’ as
commonly used in the context of payment system competition) under which both
safety and efficiency are safeguarded, and innovation incentives to develop new
products and services are not hindered.
According to Laffont and Tirole (1993), a theory of regulation should reflect
the regulatory environment and it must be consistent with the firms’ and
regulators’ information structures, constraints and feasible instruments. Mason
and Valletti (2001), in turn, argue that the biggest concern calling for regulation of
access charges in network industries is that an integrated incumbent may use its
monopoly position in some segments to sustain or expand market power in other
segments that are potentially subject to competition. This is a classic problem of
the leverage that has attracted considerable attention in the literature on bundling.
In fact, the analogy is close since an incumbent may make entry to a market
unprofitable in different ways: eg by product design or virtual tying through
pricing. Mason and Valletti (2001) discuss the basic regulatory tools applied in
many network markets (especially in the telecommunication field). Based on that,
the following broad categorisation can be made:
(a) Price regulation based on
– Long-run incremental costs
– Cost-based rules
– Efficient component pricing rule
– Ramsey charges and global caps.46
(b) Access and supply regulation based on
– Entry conditions
– Bundling of services.
Without going into the details of the above tools, some considerations relevant in
payment systems are briefly discussed next. In the payment system area, the direct
applicability of any of these basic tools is questionable, because reliable
accounting data for costs and revenues concerning only payment transaction
operations are often not directly available and they may be difficult to obtain.
According to market practitioners, payment services are commonly treated as part
of the general banking products that the service providers are offering to their
customers. This can also be clearly seen in their pricing, where indirect pricing
and cross-subsidisation are still commonly used (see section 3.2). Also the
division of fixed costs over different activities is burdensome and normally
requires some subjective decisions. Accordingly, it can be concluded that the
direct application of these tools would be very difficult in payment system
industry.
Network complements and pricing
Mason and Valletti (2001) argue that in the past it was commonly believed that
network industries exhibit strong economies of scale. For this reason, it was
preferred to have a single supplier in order to avoid wasteful duplication of
resources. In order to avoid excessive monopoly charges, the ‘natural’ monopolist
was either owned directly by the state or heavily regulated. Mason and Valletti
argue further that this view has been challenged in past few decades. Poor quality
of services offered by incumbents and the asymmetries of information between
the regulator and the regulated firm have offered additional arguments for
liberalising the entire sector. One clear example can be found in the privatisation
of railways that has taken place in many countries in recent years.
In recent years, the telecommunication industry has also received pronounced
attention by regulatory authorities in many countries. Consequently, regulatory
attention is now more often devoted to the design of an appropriate market
structure and to monitoring particular behaviour of the incumbent. Also new
regulatory methods have been introduced for regulating network industries. In
many cases, access pricing has been adopted to regulate bottleneck-type
industries. This has very often been done in the form two-part tariffs. In the
telecommunication area, interconnection disputes have arisen in a context in
which the access provider is the vertically integrated historic operator and the
newcomer is operator concentrating on the mobile phone networks.47
In principle, the fact that the bottleneck owner is allowed to compete against
other firms means that there is a danger that the incumbent will set access charges
which make entry difficult or even deny access on reasonable terms. This may
suggest that the access price should be set low, in order to counteract the anti-
competitive attitude of the incumbent. However, if the access price is set too low,
inefficient entry may occur. In payment system field, the situation can even be
more problematic. Too low access prices combined with completely open access
to a payment system may adversely affect the security and stability of the system
if the participants cannot fulfil their obligations in a timely fashion. Depending on
the system design, this could lead to the contagion of systemic risk jeopardising
the functioning of the whole market. Accordingly, it is crucial in any network
industry that the whole competition situation with the potential repercussion
effects are carefully analysed and all the external factors taken into account,
before applying any regulatory intervention method.
Access prices and investments
One of the most important issues in the economics of regulation is how to
encourage firms to innovate and invest in infrastructure. According to Mason and
Valletti (2001), there is a trade-off between optimal access regulation in static and
dynamic framework. If static regulation reduces the use of monopoly power over
the infrastructure, then it also reduces profits that can be earned by the
investor/owner of the facility. Accordingly, access regulation based on simple
cost-recovery rules can discourage investments and even lead to a
underinvestment. Moreover, there exists also a free-riding problem if market
participants know beforehand that the regulator grants access to everybody to any
new system that has been developed. Mason and Valletti conclude that, when
using economic terms, the nature of ex-post access regulation does have a clear
impact on ex-ante incentives to invest.
In the presence of infrastructure competition, like eg in the payment service
production, the regulator’s problem is many-faceted. One is the desire to have a
downstream level playing field while ensuring the incumbent can recover its
upstream fixed costs or some social obligations. This clearly is relevant in
payment systems where a desire or sometimes even a claim by market participants
to have a level playing field is often debated. In this context, the access and entry
considerations are the most crucial ones. Mason and Valletti (2001) discuss these
in the context of communication networks but the main ideas are also applicable
in payment networks. According to them, the regulator may want to promote
particular entry modes, where the typical dilemma is between (1) facility-based
and (2) service-based competition. The danger in the first case is that it may
involve unnecessary duplication of infrastructure. This refers to (i)48
the competition  for  market -situation where competition between different
systems is emphasised. In the second case, where the entrant leases the
incumbents’ access facilities, the environment can become more intrusive. This,
in turn, refers to the (ii) the competition in the market -situation. In the two
situations, (i) and (ii), there are also differences in the regulators’ attitude towards
the mode of competition. In the first case, the regulator can rely more on direct
competition than on regulatory intervention whereas in the second case, more
regulatory intervention is needed in order to provide fair access and a level
playing field.
All the above issues are also of relevance in the payment system area because,
as already emphasised in Section 3.2, there are multiple payment service
providers and, clearly, a need for cooperation. Because payment service provision
is cooperative and because of usage externalities, returns on investments depend
on the level of investments made by other banks and businesses. Accordingly, it
can be concluded that appropriate investment incentives do play an important role
in facilitating payment systems competition, and payment systems regulators
should take that into account when fostering market competition and
contestability in the field.
5 Competition and regulation in European retail
payment systems
5.1 The competition-cooperation nexus in retail payment
systems
Economic theory does not give a clear-cut answer to the question of whether
competition in services in a single network, or competition between several
networks is best for dynamic efficiency. In practice, regulatory choices can be
geared towards either services competition or infrastructure competition. As
pointed out before, this refers to competition in the market and competition for the
market. The basic question for the regulatory authorities is, which form of
competition should be promoted. When taking a position on the question, the
industry characteristics and external environment requirements need to be
critically evaluated. In essence, the industry-specific issues are relevant when
facilitating contestable markets.
As discussed in Chapter 3, certain characteristics of the payment systems
indicate that competition rules of traditional industries cannot be directly applied
to payment service industry. In payment systems, the main factor to be considered
is that a certain degree of cooperation among operators in the provision of49
payment services is highly desirable (if not even prerequisite), if the system is to
function efficiently. By network cooperation or cooperation among payment
service providers, it is possible to avoid overlapping investments and unnecessary
and inefficient duplication of networks, as well as extend services to a larger
population. While in many other markets it is evident that competition between
service providers leads both to benefits for consumers and to increased efficiency
for the market as a whole, in the provision of payment services the customers
themselves may require providers of the service to reach certain degree of
cooperation, because this normally provides more access and destination points in
the system. Therefore, the competition-cooperation nexus is of special importance
in retail payment systems where a certain degree of cooperation among service
providers needs to exist (and, in principle, needs to be tolerated by the regulatory
authorities) in order to achieve viable and efficient payment systems. In a broader
context, the compatibility of competing systems, or at least the existence of
common standards, also have a positive influence on market efficiency.
European competition law and cooperation
According to Vesala (2000), European competition law allows banks to engage in
cooperation in payment networks provided that the cooperation has no adverse
impact on price competition. He summarises the basic elements of the competition
policy guidelines as follows. Firstly, a clear distinction between interbank and
bank-client relations; cooperation in the former is tolerated provided there is no
adverse impact on competition in bank-customer relations. Secondly, the
Commission has clearly stated that attempts to block entry to shared payment
systems, and hence protect participants from outside competition, would be
regarded as violations of the antitrust rules of the EU. Finally, EU competition
provisions would be breached if the system were open in principle but entry
conditions were discriminatory, ie if the levied entry charge and unit
compensation for the services provided by the ‘host network’ exceeded the true
economic cost of operating the network (including interest on initial investment,
depreciation and goodwill). (Commission of the EC (1992), CEPS (1994)).
Based on the above, it can be concluded that, joint ventures in the payment
systems area, should be more easily tolerated by authorities because of potential
scale economies and increased cost-efficiency. However, at the same time, ‘fair
and open’ access to systems by other potential participants is a prerequisite for
that tolerance. The principal problem for the relevant authorities is related to the
question of how to define ‘fair and open’ access. In this context, the natural first
step is to define carefully the relevant markets where contestability is to be
ensured. Furthermore, another question is who are the relevant authorities: are
these competition authorities as general competition regulators and/or central50
banks as overseers of the payment systems? In fact, this question is similar to the
question related to the on-going discussion in the field of banking stability, which
is extensively surveyed by Carletti and Hartmann (2002). They examine the
relationship between competition policies and policies to preserve stability in the
banking sector by surveying both theoretical and empirical literature. They also
analyse the relative roles of competition and supervisory authorities by reviewing
bank merger cases in the G-7 industrialised countries. As a general conclusion, the
authors argue that a wide variety of approaches exists: some countries give a
stronger role to prudential supervisors than to competition authorities while in
other countries the situation is just the opposite.
In addition, Carletti and Hartmann (2002) also claim that cartel cases play a
greater role in the application of competition policy to the banking sector, in
particular regarding payment systems because these are characterised by natural
monopoly features. According to them, abuses of dominant position seem to have
remained of rather low importance in antitrust practice so far, despite the large
number of bank mergers occurring in many countries during recent years. In
general, it can be concluded that the roles of central banks and competition
authorities are not yet fully defined in the payment systems field, even though the
ultimate goal of both authorities is the same: increasing efficiency by ensuring a
level playing field and contestable markets.
Innovation and competition policy
Innovation incentives have often also been emphasised as an integral part of the
competition and efficiency goal. The traditional IO-literature gives some insights
into the relationship between innovation and competition policy. Martin (1996),
among others, proposes that R&D cooperation can provide tacit collusion.
According to him, the heart of the economic analysis of tacit collusion is that
firms hold back from expanding output in the short run, even though it would be
profitable to do so, because of the threat of future lost profit once rivals realise
that some firm is cheating on output restriction. More specifically, if firms decide
to form an R&D joint venture, it is because they expect it to be profitable. Martin
(2001) argues further that it follows from this that the threat to break up an R&D
joint venture could be part of a punishment strategy used to create incentives for
firms to restrict output. Valletti and Cambini (2003) also reach a similar
conclusion in their analysis of investment and network competition in their model
of two-part pricing that is commonly used in telecommunication industry.
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In principle, the same line of reasoning could also be applied to the shared
payment systems (joint ventures) where, the innovation efforts at least are
concentrated. Generally speaking, in payment systems the relevant decision
variable would be the price instead of the output. Accordingly, when applying IO-
theory’s prediction of market behaviour in the payment system area, tacit
collusion could be a possible outcome. Therefore, it is possible that the
cooperation at one level (upstream market, ie operation and development of
shared systems for money transfers) can lead to collusive behaviour at the other
level (downstream market of providing payment services). Whether the prediction
proves to be correct, requires a comprehensive empirical assessment. However, it
must be emphasised that this assessment is likely to be very difficult to be carried
out, because in the payment systems market, indirect pricing (consumers buy
packages of banking services, and do not necessarily pay for single money
transfers) is very commonly used.
5.2 Potential roles of regulators in retail payment systems
The debate on the potential roles of regulators and authorities in facilitating the
development in the payment system area has been going on for several years in
the European Union. In the area of large-value payment systems, the case for the
operational involvement of central banks has been grounded, among others, by the
following arguments: safeguarding the transmission channel of monetary policy,
limiting the systemic risk inherent in large value payment systems, and facilitating
the integration of the financial markets in the Single Market. Generally speaking,
it can be argued that much progress in the development of the geographically
integrated systems in the large value payments has been achieved. Today, the
publicly owned TARGET-system as well as the privately owned Euro 1 -system
are offering safe and reliable large-value payment services on the EU-wide scale
and are competing with each other in commercial payments.
In contrast to large-value payment systems, the progress in cross-border retail
payment systems (card payment systems are a clear exception) has been slow, and
the current retail payment infrastructure in the European Union is still very
fragmented, based often on the ‘traditional’ national payment habits. As discussed
in Chapter 2, the reasons for this situation are many-faceted. The payment service
providers have argued that ‘there is no business case’ for investing in new cross-
border retail payment systems, because there is insufficient demand for these
services. The authorities and regulators, in turn, have stated that low demand for
the cross-border services stems from their high prices and poor quality. In general,
this situation is similar to the famous chicken-and-egg problem or Catch-22
dilemma. According to the present survey, this phenomenon can be explained by52
network externalities (or networks effects) that are clearly present in retail
payment markets. The interdependence in demand for the retail payment services
by customers (as well as their future expectations on the sizes of payment
networks) is likely to remain an obstacle until the new payment innovations
achieve critical mass. According to the theory of network economics, this could
happen either by the efforts of service providers (eg establishment of joint
ventures and shared networks) or with authorities’ help and actions.
In both cases, the authorities or regulators need to take certain actions. In the
first, ‘market-driven case’, the regulators need to tolerate the formation of the
joint ventures and shared networks, but, at the same time, they need to ensure by
different antitrust measures (access to systems, pricing etc) that a level playing
field prevails and markets remain contestable. In the second, ‘authority-driven
case’, the spectrum of possible actions is wide. The authorities can foster the
competitive environment and investment incentives in the field by tolerant
regulatory measures (eg allow for competing ‘payment clubs’). Moreover, the
authorities can also ‘act as a catalyst or facilitator’ for development (eg
participation by authorities in developing and enforcing payment standards). As a
stronger measure, they can resort to a specific regulation (like the EU Regulation
on the cross-border payments in euro that obliges the service providers to act in a
certain way, or prohibition of the ‘float’ in payment transfers as in Norway).
Finally, as the ultimate measure, the authorities can also become ‘operationally
active’ by establishing their own systems to provide payment services. This could
happen when the authorities judge that reliable and efficient payment systems are
not provided by the market players. In this context, the universal service
obligation principle as well as public good character of payment services are used
as supportive arguments for the operational involvement. However, it should be
emphasised that the operational involvement option has been under discussion
among the relevant European authorities, but currently it is not seen as a necessary
action. Instead, the following roles of public authorities have recently been put
forward in the international fora:
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(i) Fostering competitive environment and investment incentives
Use of regulatory tools in providing a level playing field but also safeguarding
innovation and investment incentives in payment systems.
(ii) Developing and enforcing generic standards
Catalyst / facilitator role of public authorities.
In general, it can be stated that the proposed roles of public authorities rely on
more or less indirect ways to improve efficiency in the retail payment system
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field. The idea behind them is that the development process should be left to
market participants that have the best practical knowledge of the field.
Accordingly, the development process should be fostered without any strong
regulatory or operational involvement by the authorities. The main task for the
authorities is to provide a level playing field and an external (legislative)
environment where innovation incentives to develop new and more efficient
systems are guaranteed.
In some countries the authorities have, however, assumed a more active role.
For example in Norway, changes to traditional charging conventions in the pricing
of retail payment services have been promoted by authorities
46. Instead of
applying the principle of indirect pricing backed by cross-subsidies, direct (cost-
based) pricing to guide customers towards using the most efficient payment
methods has been strongly promoted. In general, this has been seen to foster the
replacement of ‘old-fashioned’ paper-based payment instruments by more modern
electronic payment methods.
All in all, it can be concluded that the promoter and facilitator role of public
authorities is of great importance in facilitating efficiency in payment systems. In
essence, the authorities should try to facilitate the development by providing the
supportive external environment including up-to-date and non-discriminatory
legislation. Other type of involvement, eg at the operational level, may only
become warranted in such circumstances where a clear market failure is detected
after a comprehensive market study.
5.3 Future developments in the European retail payment
markets
The landscape of the European retail payment markets is today still fragmented
even after the introduction of euro notes and coins as an ultimate manifestation of
monetary integration process. In general, it can be argued that the EU still consists
of 15 (and with the accession countries even more) heterogeneous payment areas
instead of one single payment market. However, it must be understood that the
development of Single Market in the retail payment system area cannot take place
overnight, and that the development of systems is characterised by path-
dependence and slow change of payment habits. In this context, it must also be
recognised that many national payment systems are already functioning efficiently
but what have been lacking are the well-functioning and efficient cross-border
retail payment methods to contribute the financial integration process in the
Europe.
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In fact, it was exactly the above observation that finally triggered the
European Commission and Parliament to adopt Regulation EC No. 2560/2001 on
Cross-Border Payments in Euro (RPE) in December 2001. The RPE obliged
banks to reduce charges for cross-border payments of up to EUR 12,500 (EUR
50,000 as of January 2006) to the level of those of corresponding domestic
payments. The Regulation applies to card payments and ATM withdrawals as
from 1 July 2002 and to cross-border credit transfers as from 1 July 2003. This
policy intervention was strongly criticised by the payment service provider sector
that argued for a market-driven solution. However, it should be noted that the
RPE has already had some positive development effects in the retail payment
systems field. It has even been argued that it was only after the usage of the
regulatory power (RPE) that the payment service providers were forced act.
Accordingly, in the aftermath of the RPE, the banking sector activated and formed
a new cooperation body of their own, the European Payment Council (EPC).
47 In
principle, the EPC should be able to address the potential difficulty of reaching
consensus among wide and divergent participant group.
The EPC has signalled that the payment service providers are prepared to
move forward the necessary harmonisation of payment systems and instruments,
as much as possible through self-regulation. In their opinion, legislation and
regulation should only be used where the harmonisation cannot be achieved by
other means. As a concrete measure to facilitate the development and smooth
adaptation of RPE, the European banking sector is advocating the establishment
of a pan-European ACH as quickly as possible. In practice, the Euro Banking
Association’s STEP 2 -system should act as a PEACH (Pan-European Automated
Clearing House) and provide a pan-European system for processing bulk
payments. In the light of network theory, the crucial question for the viability of
the systems is that it attracts sufficient number of payments processed through it
(the critical mass requirement discussed in section 4.1) in order to facilitate cost-
recovery. Accordingly, the volumes of pure European cross-border credit transfers
may not be sufficient to ensure the critical number of payments and, therefore,
also part of the national / domestic volumes of retail payments should be directed
through it as well.
Another factor that will have an effect on the European retail payment
landscape is the recent emergence of new payment initiatives. For example, card
payment providers are expanding their traditional field of business and entering
credit transfer markets currently dominated by the banks and their joint ventures
as primary service providers. For example, Visa EU has launched its Visa Direct
initiative that has been developed to enable payment service providers to comply
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with the RPE. Competition is also intensifying by alternative new, non-bank
payment service providers, like PayPal that has recently introduced sterling and
euro currency transfers as well as mobile payment operators, like Paybox and
Vodafone. Also companies like Western Union and MoneyGram, which provide
cross-border cash transfer services, have increased their activities. In general, it
can be concluded that competition from other payment service providers, besides
the traditional banks, is clearly increasing. This development is going to foster
competition and innovation among service providers, and, thereby, also likely to
facilitate improvements in efficiency in payment service industry.
In assessing the roles of public authorities as payment system regulators, the
following competencies in the EU / euro area are worth stressing. The public
authorities, like the European Commission and the ECB/ESCB, have their
respective, and partly overlapping roles in facilitating the development and
promoting efficiency in the retail payment systems field. The Commission is
currently working on the harmonisation of the EU legal environment in payment
systems and the ECB has continued to stress its role as a catalyst eg in defining
and implementing new standards in the euro payment system field. Accordingly,
it can be concluded that the authorities and regulators have recognised their role in
facilitating the development towards the Single Payment Area. In fact, this
reflects some key findings of the present study on the interaction between the
competition-cooperation nexus and regulation where industry-specific network
effects do play an important role and need to be taken into account by the
regulatory authorities. In an ideal situation, market players would provide the
most efficient solutions and regulatory authorities would be in charge of their
oversight. Moreover, the authorities should ensure that the markets remain
contestable but at the same time provide such a legislative and regulatory
environment that does not form obstacles for efficiency-enhancing cooperation
(eg development of common standards, business practices etc) among payment
service providers.56
6 Conclusions
As in any other network industry, the crucial question for regulators in retail
payment systems is whether competition in services in a single network
(competition in the market) or competition between several networks (competition
for the market) is best for the efficiency. There is no universal answer to that
question because the industry-specific and external factors play a decisive role in
practical applications of regulatory policy. In payment systems, the main industry-
specific factor to be considered is that a certain degree of cooperation among
payment service providers is needed for the system(s) to function efficiently. The
reason for this is that there are several parties involved in money transfers: sender,
service provider, receiver, and their respective institutions. The essential
requirement from the cost-efficiency point of view, is that all these, or their
institutions, are connected to the same system or compatible systems. In a
nutshell, it is the compatibility that is the key requirement for the payment system
efficiency by making payment system market contestable. Accordingly, the
regulatory authorities should concentrate their efforts on facilitating compatibility
in the payment system market eg by developing and enforcing common standards.
As a result, competition in the market would increase, and the need for resorting
to the secondary regulation tools, like price regulation, would diminish.
An additional prerequisite for efficiency is that a viable payment system needs
to achieve a critical mass of users so that the potential economies of scale in
payment production can be realised. Therefore, it is no wonder, that the payment
system industry is dominated by joint ventures and shared networks that facilitate
the acquisition of installed base of users. In the same vein, also the chicken-and-
egg problem has proved hard to overcome for many new payment initiatives as
witnessed eg by the slow development of e-money schemes in many countries.
The network nature of payment systems has also strong implications on the
competition and innovation in the area. On the one hand, cooperation among
service providers is needed on establishing standards and infrastructures in order
to have a large enough customer base for their services (network effect). On the
other hand, agreement on compatibility or common standards potentially increases
competition and may thus reduce service providers’ incentives for the increased
compatibility (competition effect). Accordingly, the key question for regulatory
authorities is to find the correct measures that maximise social welfare in this type
of environment.
One of the most essential future tasks for all the key parties involved in the
development of retail payment systems is to strengthen the cooperation at all
levels in order to avoid overlapping development efforts, and to focus on the most
relevant issues. Recently, the following roles of public authorities have been
advocated in the international fora: i) Fostering competitive environment and57
innovation incentives (using regulatory tools in providing a level playing field but
also safeguarding innovation and investment incentives in payment systems), ii)
Developing and enforcing generic standards (catalyst and facilitator role of public
authorities, resort to regulatory intervention only if seen appropriate eg in the
enforcement of commonly agreed standards). In the presence of common
standards, competition in the market (referring to the payments market in general)
facilitates efficiency in the industry. The payment system regulators should
recognise this and direct their regulatory interventions accordingly. In the
European regulatory field, cooperation between the Commission and the
ECB/ESCB is crucial to avoid a situation where extensive and overlapping
regulation acts as an impediment to the development. Furthermore, the roles of
competition authorities and other regulators, including central banks as overseers
of the payment systems, in the quest for the payment systems efficiency are to a
certain extent unclear both at the national and the European level. Therefore,
further cooperation efforts are needed, and commonly agreed and applied
payment standards at the global level would naturally be the most preferable
outcome.58
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Automated Clearing House. An electronic clearing system where payments are
exchanged among financial institutions, primarily via magnetic media or






European Committee on Banking Standards, established in 1992 by Europe’s
three credit sector associations to enhance European technical banking
infrastructure by developing standards when clear business and commercial
interest has been identified. ECBS has developed eg IBAN and IPI standards.
EFTPOS
Electronic Fund Transfer at Point Of Sale
EPC
European Payments Council. A cooperation body established by the European
banks and banking associations in June 2002 to represent the industry and
facilitate the development of the Single Euro Payment Area.
Euro 1
Large-value payment system operated by the Euro Banking Association.
IBAN




Pan-European Automated Clearing House69
RPE
European Parliament and the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No. 2560/2001 on
Cross-border Payments in Euro in December 2001. The RPE obliges banks to
reduce charges for cross-border payments of up to EUR 12,500 (EUR 50,000 as
of January 2006) to the level of those of corresponding domestic payments. The
RPE applies to card payments and ATM withdrawals as from 1 July 2002 and to
cross-border credit transfers as from 1 July 2003.
RTGS
Real-time gross settlement system. A gross settlement system where processing
and settlement takes place in real time (continuously).
SEPA
Single Euro Payment Area, an initiative by the European Payments Council.
STEP 1
Retail payment system operated by the Euro Banking Association
STEP 2
Retail payment system for bulk payments by the Euro Banking Association,
planned to start operation in Q3 /2003. Step 2 -system is also proposed to operate
as PEACH.
TARGET
Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system,
A payment system for euro payments; it consist of 15 EU central banks’ RTGS-
systems and the Payment Mechanism of the European Central Bank.BANK OF FINLAND DISCUSSION PAPERS
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